The International Islamic Front (the umbrella organization of which al Qaeda is the core) is fighting a long term war against the West. B Raman writes an interesting article in the Asia Times explaining the challenges of the war, the need for greater international cooperation, flexibility in intelligence gathering and data sharing, improved usage of technology and training, and better means for fighting. Portions of the article are excerpted, and while I disagree with some statements (some of which are identified below) the article contains some excellent points and is worth reading in its entirety.

Mr. Raman begins by looking at the goals of al Qaeda and its International Islamic Front:

Anti-US anger is a common motivating factor of all international jihadi terrorist groups belonging to the International Islamic Front from wherever they operate. They may talk of their ultimate objective of forming regional Islamic caliphates, but their short and medium-term objective is to punish the US and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq wherever they can, whenever they can and in whatever manner they can. They have no qualms over killing innocent civilians in whatever number they have to and over collateral deaths of the members of their own community as a result of their operations directed against their perceived adversaries.

Mr. Raman has truncated al Qaeda’s strategy and objectives. Rohan Gunaratna, in Inside al Qaeda explains al Qaeda’s short term goal is to eject the United States from the Middle East, the medium term goal is the creation of the Islamic caliphates and the long term goals is “to build a formidable array of Islamic states - including ones with nuclear capability - to wage war on the US (the "Great Satan") and its allies" (page 84). The short term goal of chasing the US from the Middle East is vital for the prospect of forming an Islamic caliphate with a nuclear potential. This is why the United States must not retreat from the fight in the Middle East, lest we cede the field of battle to our enemy, increase his morale and make it easier for him to move onto his next objective.

He then identifies the unyielding nature of the enemy and why they cannot be reasoned with, but must be defeated:

Since reprisals and the urge to humiliate the US and force it to leave the Islamic world are their basic motivating force, there is little scope for political and economic approaches for dealing with them and little possibility of countering them intellectually and ideologically and of winning their hearts and minds. The campaign against international jihadi terrorism will, therefore, have to depend on a basket of professional, operational and psychological measures such as better collection, analysis and use of intelligence, better physical security, better scientific and technical means, better arms and ammunition, better tradecraft, better tactics, better psywar etc. Since the terrorists' modus operandi keep changing fast, the counter-terrorism techniques of the state agencies have to change fast too. The campaign against jihadi terrorism will be long and hard before jihadi fatigue and the weakening of the will triggers off the process of their withering away.

The international community is vital to fighting the war, as is the United States, but Mr. Raman sees a conflict between the two, and places the blame squarely on America’s approach to fighting the war. He excludes the internationals' lack of political will, lack of ability to commit significant resources to the war effort, and the domination of international institutions by nations and regions indifferent or hostile to the struggle against fighting international terrorists.

The question before the international community in its fight against international jihadi terrorism will continue to be not how to wean the terrorists away from the path of violence. This is unlikely unless and until their will is broken. The real question is how to wean their own community and co-religionists away from the terrorists. For this to succeed, it is important to contain the spread of anger in the Islamic world and to remove the causes of anger. The dilemma faced by the international community in this task is due to the fact that only the US, because of its material and technological resources, has the ability to lead the international coalition in the so-called "war against terrorism", but its over-militarized approach, its inability to understand the Muslim mind and the Islamic culture and its insensitivity to what hurts Muslim pride are aggravating Muslim anger, instead of making it subside. Its counter-terrorism methods, with the use of the air force and heavy armor, are themselves becoming an important root cause of terrorism.

Mr. Raman’s claim of an “over-militarized approach” as being a “root cause of terrorism” is baseless, however. There is no supporting evidence that recruiting has increased due to American military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The outcry of support for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in certain segments of the Islamic world even prior to the US led assault on Afghanistan shows there already was a wide base willing to aid the terrorists. In Afghanistan today, the Taliban and al Qaeda have essentially ceded the battlefield to the Coalition due to a lack of popular support, despite the usage of air power and armor extensively. In Iraq, the Coalition and Iraqi government are facing an insurgency planned well in advance by Saddam’s secret police, and aided by al Qaeda and other foreign jihadis.

On one hand, Mr. Raman understand that the jihadis have a committed, well organized and highly motivated network whose ultimate goal is the destruction of civilization as we know it, and whose “will” must be “broken”. On the other hand he falls into the usual trap of blaming the United States for the creation of terrorists and for fighting back. He understands the need to fight, but he claims fighting only exacerbates Muslim rage.

Concerning the issues of “Muslim pride” and “anger”, those who hold these claims to be true should review the Iranians’ reactions their own regime, the Lebanese reaction to the Syrian opposition, or the Indonesian's newfound support for America’s actions in fighting terrorism. We have had success on the ideological front while actively fighting in Muslim nations. Treating all Muslims as a homogenous group whose “pride” and “anger” is directed against American is a flawed way of thinking, and it harkens back to the non-existent Arab Street.

The myth of American-insired Muslim rage is brought home at the end of the article, when Mr. Raman identifies the increase in Islamist terrorism in his own nation of India. Does he blame Indian tactics in fighting terrorists in Kashmir and Jammu for the rise in hatred against his nation? Would he advocate a kindler, gentler approach to fighting Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Harakat ul-Mujahidin, al Qaeda sponsored terrorist groups that are murdering Indians inside and outside of the region?

Despite any disagreements with Mr. Raman, he is correct in his assertions that the war needs to be fought as a long term struggle and international cooperation in diplomatic, military, intelligence and ideological components are vital to its success.

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