More Middlemen
Al Qaeda's middle managers continue to take a beating. Two senior commanders, one in Saudi Arabia, and one in Turkey, have been removed from action. The dismantlement of al Qaeda’s middle managers - its most senior field operatives with extensive knowledge, training and contacts in the jihadi world - is crucial to reducing al Qaeda’s abilities to carry out mass casualty attacks.
In Saudi Arabia, Salah Mohammed al-Aufi, the commander of the Saud branch of "the deviant group" - the Kingdom's term for al Qaeda - has been killed in a gunfight after Saudi security forces launched multiple raids against suspected al Qaeda hideouts in Riyadh and Medina. One other "deviant" was killed, and ten others were arrested. al-Aufi follows a long line of Saudi commanders and leaders killed or captured since al Qaeda launched its war against the Saudi regime.
In Turkey, Luai Sakra, an al Qaeda operative of Syrian descent was detained “on suspicion of involvement in the November 2003 suicide bomb attacks in Istanbul, and Turkish police have said he was also hatching a plot to blow up Israeli cruise liners in the southern Turkish resort of Antalya.” Sakra also claims to have fought along side Zarqawi in Fallujah as well as provided material support to the 9-11 hijackers. While the connections to Zarqawi will no doubt raise the cries of invasion and occupation of Iraq inspired terrorism, his jihadi credentials begin prior to the Iraq war.
Like the motivations behind the attacks in Bangladesh (“Besides calling for Islamic rule in Bangladesh…”) demonstrate, "[Sakra’s] jihad didn't start with Zarqawi." Al Qaeda has deftly promoted the “Iraq is responsible for terrorism” meme, despite the reams of evidence for al Qaeda attacks completely unrelated to Iraq {see flash presentation, 2M download}, and the media and opponents of the war have freely and carelessly propagated it. Iraq is merely a red herring designed to divide the West and sap its morale and will to fight.
Despite the obstacles placed in front of the United States and her allies, remarkable progress has been made in dismantling al Qaeda’s middle management. It is no small task to root out the infrastructure of a shadow terrorist organization, on its home turf and often amidst friendly populations. Defeating al Qaeda and its violent Islamist ideology will require a non-military solution which includes the rejection of their ideology by the Muslim world.
The elimination of the violent terrorists of al Qaeda is also required, as these jihadis will not eschew violence for a political solution. The elimination of al Qaeda’s middle management is crucial to reducing the effectiveness of al Qaeda and to leading to its eventual military defeat. Without experienced leaders, the ability to plan and carry out dramatic attacks is compromised, and al Qaeda's status and prestige is reduced, affecting their recruiting, fundraising and sympathetic support. The military defeat can hasten the rejection of al Qaeda in the Muslim world, exposing them as the weak horse.
